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modified form as a chapter in the The Reform of UK Company Law (John De Lacy 
ed., Cavendish Publishing, London, forthcoming 2002). My thanks to the editor and 
to Cavendish for permission to use material prepared for that chapter.
THE COMPANY LAW STEERING GROUP 
AND GROUPS OF COMPANIES
The Steering Group's treatment of corporate group matters will be analysed under three sub-headings. First, the Group's views on corporate group 
liability in tort will be considered, followed by an 
assessment of the wider governance proposals for groups 
in the light of their likely impact on the risk of negligent 
action being taken by the company and its officers. 
Thirdly, the possible reasons behind the silence of the 
Final Report on group issues will be discussed.
Group Liability in Tort
The Steering Group accepts that the arguments for 
permitting parent companies to take advantage of limited 
liability in relation to tort liability are less strong than in 
the case of liability to creditors, given tiiat the latter can 
exact a price for the credit to reflect the risk, while in 
cases of tort liability the parent can externalise the risk 
without the need to compensate. Furthermore, it is 
recognised that torts may protect very important interests 
such as freedom from wrongful personal injury. (See 
Completing the Structure, DTI, at para. 10.58). However, 
the Steering Group also notes that the British courts are 
unwilling to 'lift the corporate veil' in such cases, citing 
the case of Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 433 in 
support. The Steering Group continues:
'However, there are circumstances in which we regard it as 
entirely proper Jor a holding company to segregate an activity in 
a subsidiary with the risks of liability, including tortious or 
delictual liability, in mind. Many torts are closely linked with 
contractual liabilities, Jbr example liability Jor professional services 
and misrepresentation and product liability. We are also not 
aware of any jurisdiction providing Jor parent companies to be 
automatically liable Jor the torts or delicts oftheir subsidiaries. 
Defining the circumstances in which the use of limited liability in 
this way should be regarded as abusive would be difficult. Nor 
are we aware of cases where parent companies have engaged in 
such abuse. The under-capitalisation of subsidiaries, and their 
operation in a way, which creates undue risks of insolvency, are 
matters best dealt with by insolvency law. We do not propose any 
reforms in this regard'. (See "Completing the Structure", at 
para. 10.59.)
That is all the Steering Group says. There are many 
shortcomings in this approach. First, reliance on the 
hesitation of judges to 'lift the corporate veil' seems 
overcautious for a law reform committee. A review of the 
validity, in policy terms, of the approach taken in A dams v 
Cape Industries would be entirely proper for such a body. 
There are, indeed, a number of reasons for reconsidering 
whether the strict approach to corporate separation taken 
in that case should be followed.
The main issue in the Adams case was whether a US 
personal injuries court award, that used quantification
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techniques regarded as contrary to principles of justice in 
England, should be recognised here. By emphasising the 
legal separation between Cape and its US sales subsidiary, 
and the independently owned associated sales company 
that replaced it, such recognition could be avoided on the 
ground that the English based parent company was not 
present in the US through its subsidiary, or through the 
independent sales company with which it had business 
links. It is likely that the refusal by the Court of Appeal to 
'lift the corporate veil', or to see the apparently 
independent sales company that replaced the sales 
subsidiary in the US as de facto controlled by Cape, was 
motivated by a desire to prevent recognition of an award 
that was tainted in the eyes of English principles of justice. 
If so, then the case turned on issues of private 
international law, to which the corporate separation 
between Cape, its overseas subsidiary and subsequent 
associate company was a convenient justification for non- 
recognition.
As such, the case did not turn on the issue of 
substantive liability in tort, where, given the seriousness of 
the risk that Cape could externalise its liability in 
negligence through the interposition of a separate 
corporate entity, the very question of whether the 
corporate veil should be lifted is central. It is true that in 
recent years the courts have tended to follow the narrow 
approach to 'lifting the corporate veil' championed by 
Adams v Cape Industries. This includes cases involving the 
tortious responsibility of corporations. (See Williams v 
Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830 (HL). 
But note that this case involved negligent misstatement,
o o '
not liability for personal injuries, and so may be seen as 
coming within the commercial sphere where control over 
risk of liability, by way of corporate separation, may be 
more easily justified. Similarly the case of Yukong Line Ltd 
of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corp of Liberia (The 
Rialto) (No.2) [1998] 1 WLR 294 involved issues of 
insolvency and alleged conspiracy in a commercial 
context). However, this does not mean that such an 
approach must be written in stone for all time. In an 
earlier period, the courts have been more willing to 'lift 
the corporate veil' to do justice. (See further Alan Dignam 
and David Alien Company Law and the Human Rights Act 
1998 (London, Butterworths, 2000) at pp.215-21 and 
the cases cited therein). There is no reason why they 
should not do so again. Indeed, it could be said that the 
outcome of the recent Connelly and Cape cases suggests 
that the parent company may be answerable in court for 
certain actions of its subsidiary, (as do Dignam and Alien 
ibid at pp.218 .221) though it is dangerous to read too 
much into these decisions, being decisions on private 
international law and not on the substantive company law 
points that underlie them. However, tihere are at least two 
persuasive legal reasons why the courts might have to 
reconsider their attitude to this doctrine, at least in cases 
such as Cape. Firstly, the idea of separation between the
company and its shareholders, which underlies the 
separate entity doctrine, (see P Ireland 'Company Law and 
the Myth of Shareholder Ownership' 62 Modern Law 
Review 32 (1999)) has no place in the parent/subsidiary 
relationship. As noted in earlier parts of this paper, the 
parent is not an individual, with little or no interest in the 
running of the subsidiary as if it were no more than a 
portfolio shareholder. It is the actual manager of the 
subsidiary. It is a direct investor and that means something 
very different in terms of responsibility. It means the 
parent controls and is, in a real business sense, responsible 
for that which it controls. To ignore this is to condemn the 
law to abuse by the unscrupulous. Furthermore, given that 
a small trader cannot usually hide behind their company 
and often has to put up their family home as a guarantee 
for their business - probably the largest single exception to 
the doctrine of corporate separation - the case of the 
affiliate of a MNE having the assets of its parent behind it 
seems an a fortiori case. After all the shareholders of the 
parent are still safe. In fact they are probably safer from 
ruin than the small trader's own partner and children!
Secondly, the Human Rights Act 1998 may require that, 
in certain cases, the corporate veil will have to be lifted in 
order to ensure the protection of the human rights of 
claimants (see Dignam and Alien ibid). This may involve, 
for example, the need to protect: the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of their property on the part of the claimant, 
preventing the abuse of the corporate form to shield the 
defendant from liability to the claimant; the right to a fair 
trial, in that the parent may have to answer claims brought 
against their affiliate where there exists evidence of parent 
company involvement in the course of action and of 
decision leading to the claim; the right to an effective 
remedy before the courts, which requires a court, in the 
exercise of its discretion, to ensure that the claimant is 
able to have their claim effectively considered. Thus, an 
over-restrictive denial of the 'lifting of the corporate veil' 
could, in turn, deny such a remedy. Yet, despite such 
arguments, at the hands of the Steering Group, Adams v 
Cape Industries has grown into a device for the avoidance 
of a full discussion as to whether that case went too far in 
protecting the legal separation between parent and 
subsidiary. It is submitted that that case did indeed go too 
far, by accepting an act that can be fairly described as a 
'sharp practice': the deliberate interposition of a 
seemingly independent company between the English 
parent and its US customer for asbestos, in anticipation of 
the claims that Cape Industries was going to face there 
from employees of the customer, who alleged that they 
had been injured by the asbestos. Is this the kind of 
activity that English company law seeks to encourage?
In addition, the Steering Group conflates torts 
committed in breach of contract with other types of tort. 
Clearly, this fails to appreciate some very fundamental 
distinctions between different types of torts. While the
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trend in commercial law has been to control the rise of 
tort liability by means of contractual provisions, so as to 
return to the contracting parties a degree of control over 
their allocation of risks on the transaction, this cannot be 
taken to represent good policy across all types of torts. In 
particular, not all contractual regimes are appropriately 
seen as the outcome of an equal bargain. In such cases, the 
law accepts that some protection is needed for the weaker 
party. Thus, the specific mention of product liability cases 
seems rather puzzling. The deliberate use of a subsidiary 
to insulate the parent against liability for a negligently 
manufactured product would appear to be a good case for 
considering the lifting of the veil and making the parent 
responsible, at least so far as private consumer claimants 
are concerned. The case of commercial consumers may be 
different on the grounds of more equal bargaining power,o T o o r   '
which should lead such consumers to require guarantees 
from the parent or to accept their own risk in purchasing 
the goods, though even here complex questions as to the 
distribution of knowledge of risks may require some 
protection for the business consumer. Equally, in the case 
of employment contracts, the reasoning implicit in the 
opinion of the Steering Group would be inapplicable given 
the demise of doctrines such as those of 'common 
employment' or of voluntary assumption of risk by 
employees.
Furthermore, when liability for hazardous industrial 
processes is in question, as in the Cape and Thor 
Chemicals cases, the potential seriousness of the 
foreseeable harm caused by the negligent operation of 
industrial processes on the part of subsidiaries to 
employees and third parties goes beyond contract. Here 
the public policy of the law will dictate the nature and 
extent of the duty of care. It is here that the interposition 
of separate corporate entities may be used in an excessive 
or abusive manner. However, instead of examining this 
question the Steering Group shies away from it on a 
number of indefensible grounds. Firstly, it says that no 
other jurisdiction has accepted automatic parent liability 
for the torts of its subsidiary, ignoring the development, in 
India, of a concept of absolute enterprise liability for 
injury caused by the conduct of ultra-hazardous industrial 
processes. (See Mehta v Union of India AIR 1987 SC at 
p. 1086 and see, for a discussion of the problems 
associated with this doctrine, Muchlinski, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law, at pp.326-8). While this doctrine 
may not be the answer to the problems under discussion, 
it nonetheless warrants an examination. Furthermore, the 
Steering Group's assertion appears to equate the absence 
of a particular rule of law in any other legal system with 
the desirability of that situation. That flies in the face of 
the way in which company law has grown, as a response to 
problems perceived at any particular time with the 
governance and operations of companies. (See DTI 
Modern Company Lawjor a Competitive Economy (London, 
DTI, March 1998) at para.2.5; hereafter Competitive
Economy). Perhaps it is only now that the problem of the 
abuse of the corporate legal form by groups to insulate 
against the legitimate application of tort liability is coming 
to be seen as a problem. Perhaps, too, no legal system has 
tried to take a lead given the fear of undermining theo o
competitive position of its economy if it is seen as creating 
increased operating risks for groups subject to its laws. 
That, however, is an argument for a co-ordinated 
international policy on group liability in tort in hazardous 
industries, on which the Steering Committee could have
' o
taken a lead.
Secondly, the Steering Group says that defining the 
circumstances where the abuse of limited liability occurs 
would be difficult. If difficulty were a bar to legal reform 
then very little of it would ever occur! In any case, is it so 
difficult to see that it is morally repugnant for a large, 
profitable, corporate group to hide behind the legal fiction 
of corporate separation in order to externalise risks onto 
involuntary creditors, who may not be able to bear those 
risks, especially in poorer communities and/or in 
developing countries? Perhaps it is, if one's focus is too 
much on making company law as cost-free as possible for 
corporations to improve their 'competitiveness'. Thirdly, 
the Steering Group asserts that it is unaware of cases 
where parent companies have engaged in such abuse. 
Three points can be made in response: firstly, if the 
Steering Group is referring to the lack of any judicial 
findings of such abuse then it has been made clear above 
why this is so   cases mostly settle out of court; secondly, 
at the very least, the Steering Group could have expressly 
considered such evidence of abuse as might be availableo
from claimants, their lawyers and pressure groups engaged 
in this field; thirdly, an abuse remains an abuse even if it 
is, thankfully, a rare event, a fact that is not to be doubted 
in relation to the vast majority of responsible corporate 
groups.
Governance of Groups and Risk Reduction
In the light of the foregoing discussion it should be 
remembered that litigation ought to be the last resort as ao o
means of ensuring that MNE groups comply with 
standards and duties of care in relation to their hazardous 
operations. A better approach is to provide corporate 
governance structures that help reduce the risk of 
negligent corporate behaviour from arising in the first 
place
In this regard the Steering Group offers a suggestion for 
reform of the parent/subsidiary relationship by means of 
an 'elective' regime for groups. (See Completing the 
Structure at paras. 10.19-10.57). The suggestion is that, 'in 
exchange for a guarantee by the parent company of the 
liabilities of a subsidiary and satisfaction of certain 
publicity requirements, the subsidiary shall be exempted 
from the requirements under the [Companies] Act 
relating to annual accounts and audit'. (See Completing the
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Structure at paras. 10.19-10.57). The Steering Group saw 
no merit in a more integrated regime for corporate groups 
as this would detract from flexibility in the way businesses 
organised themselves and would strike at the limited 
liability basis for company law. (See Completing the 
Structure at para. 10.20). To be a member of an 'elective' 
group an 'elective subsidiary' must be wholly owned and 
exclusively controlled by the elective parent. The 
administering group should be free to decide which wholly 
owned subsidiaries make the election. Third parties must 
be informed of the election by means of clear information.
The elective parent's guarantee applies to all the 
liabilities of the elective subsidiary, including liabilities in 
tort or delict, (see Completing the Structure at para. 10.28) 
but there is no reciprocal guarantee of the parent's 
liabilities by the subsidiary. The guarantee is a 'simple 
bilateral guarantee' making the assets of the elective parent 
and subsidiary available to settle liabilities. The Steering 
Group rejected a 'pooling' of liability across the group as 
a whole. Such a wider pooling of assets would, in the 
Steering Group's opinion, raise some significant 
difficulties for overseas parents in particular, in that an 
elective parent located in another EU Member State might 
have to be sued there by a creditor, subject to the rules of 
the Brussels Convention. (See Completing the Structure, at 
paras. 10.34-10.36. The 'elective' regime would only be 
available to EU based parent companies on the basis of the 
non-discrimination rule in EU law, but not to parents 
based outside the EU; see at para. 10.37).
The Steering Group's proposal is significant, in that for 
the first time, consideration is being given to the question 
whether English law should have a specialised regime for 
group liabilities, though die proposal expressly falls short 
of the types of regime found in the German Stock 
Corporations Act 1965 or the now shelved draft Ninth 
Directive on Company Law of the EU. However, the 
proposal appears to offer little that might help to avoid the 
kind of mass tort litigation seen in Cape or Thor 
Chemicals. Though an express election by die parent to 
guarantee the liabilities of its subsidiary is a means of 
avoiding die use of corporate separation as a defence to 
direct claims against the parent, the proposal fails to 
address other very important matters. Firstly, there is no 
compulsion on the parent to make an election. Thus, it 
would be perfectly legitimate to leave out subsidiaries 
undertaking high-risk operations, where full limited 
liability would continue. Secondly, the proposal is silent on 
whether election could extend to any subsidiary, including 
an overseas subsidiary of an English based parent 
company. It may be presumed that it extends to UK based 
subsidiaries only as otherwise the proposal will have an 
extraterritorial dimension that would be inconsistent with 
earlier case law. (See: Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 
433, Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Co v 
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd [1983] 
Ch 258 (CA)). On the other hand, as the House of Lords
decision in Lubbe v Cape Pic [2000] 1 WLR 1545 shows, 
an English based parent can be taken to court to 
determine whether it is liable for the acts of its overseas 
subsidiaries. If the elective regime were to be unavailable 
in such cases, a difference would arise in the legal regime
' o o
applicable to English domestic groups and English based 
multinational groups. The former would be subject to 
greater potential liabilities than the latter should they 
chose to confer elective status on dieir English based 
subsidiaries as compared to the liabilities faced by English 
based parents for their overseas subsidiaries upon whom 
such an election could not be made. The Steering Group 
does not explain why such a difference of treatment 
between domestic and overseas subsidiaries might arise.o
Indeed, the proposal as a whole is remarkable for the 
absence of any serious consideration of the jurisdictional 
matters it raises, save for the point that the elective regime 
would apply only to other EU based parent companies, 
but not to groups whose parent company was from 
outside the EU. (See Completing the Structure, at 
para. 10.37).
Thirdly, the rejection of a 'pooling' approach to the 
delineation of the 'capital boundary' (on which see further 
H Collins Ascription of Eegal Responsibility to Groups in 
Complex Patterns of Economic Integration' (1990) 53 
Modern Law Review 731) of assets available to claimants 
ignores a basic problem in mass tort litigation: where the 
economic activity of the group as a whole is involved in the 
hazardous processes diat lead to the harm causing the 
claims, then the entire asset base of the group should be 
available on the ground that the group as a whole is 
involved in the harm. Furthermore, as in the Bhopal 
litigation, the sheer number of claimants may be so great 
that the assets of the entire group may be needed to meet 
tiieir claims. Moreover, as in Cape, the subsidiaries that 
are alleged to have caused the claimants' injuries may no 
longer be in operation but the assets of the group, which 
have been enhanced by the operation in the past of those 
subsidiaries, still exist.
Fourthly, even where the parent does elect to cover the 
liabilities of its subsidiary, this means very little if it is not 
asset rich. It would be relatively easy to insulate the parent 
from liability by removing its assets offshore, rather as in 
the Multinational Gas [1983] Ch 258 case where the 
assets of the joint venture company in question were 
located in Liberia, while the main business operations 
occurred in England through a services only company. In 
the absence of clear minimum asset requirements on the 
part of die elective parent and subsidiary the election 
would be meaningless. Furthermore, as pointed out by 
respondents to the proposal, unless the guarantee is 
contained in a standardised statutory form, it could be 
rendered ineffective given that guarantees offered by a 
parent on behalf of its subsidiary are notoriously difficult 
to enforce unless diey are very clearly worded. (See 
Company Law Review: Responses to the Consultation
Amicus Curiae Issue 40 March/April 2002
Document Completing the Structure at Chapter 10 
question 10.1; hereafter Responses. See also: Re Augustus 
Barnett [1986] BCLC 170; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v 
Malaysia Mining Corporation [1989] 1 WLR 379; 
Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd (in 
liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd 
[1982] QB 84).
Thus the capacity of the 'elective group' concept to deal 
with the issues underlying mass tort litigation in England 
against English based parent companies is limited. 
However, there is one further aspect of the Steering 
Group's proposal that needs to be mentioned. Elective 
group membership does not obviate the need, on the part 
of an elective subsidiary, to comply with the proposed new 
operating and financial review (OFR). (See Completing the 
Structure, at para. 10.42). According to the Steering Group 
the OFR is a pillar of the new approach to corporate 
governance, alongside the proposed statement of directors 
duties which includes not only a duty to take account of 
shareholder interests but also those of others. (See 
Completing the Structure, at para.3.2. See further Final 
Report, at Chapter 8). The OFR is to be published by all 
public and very large private companies (defined as having 
an annual turnover of more than £500million) as part of 
the annual report. It is to give an account by the directors 
of:
'the performance and direction of the business, including in all 
cases djair review of achievements, trends and strategic direction, 
and covering other matters, including wider relationships, risks 
and opportunities and social and environmental impacts where 
these are relevant to an understanding of the performance of the 
business' (See "Completing the Structure", at para.3.2, and see 
Jurther "Final Report", at Chapter 8).
The aim of the OFR is to 'account for and demonstrate 
stewardship of a wide range of relationships and resources 
which are of vital significance to the success of modern 
business, but often do not register effectively, or at all, in 
financial accounts'. (See Completing the Structure, at 
para.3.4). The question arises, how far can the OFR be 
used as a vehicle for ensuring more responsible corporate 
practice, especially in relation to the operation of overseas 
subsidiaries in areas prone to the creation of risks of 
personal injury such as health and safety, employment and 
environmental practices? In principle the OFR should 
provide a more transparent and accountable approach to 
these matters. However, the directors retain considerable 
discretion in relation to how they report the wider issues 
of corporate performance. The Steering Group has 
recognised that this discretion must be exercised in good 
faith on the basis of a test as to the materiality of the 
information to be disclosed. (See Completing the 
Structure, at para.3.7). Equally it accepts that certain 
matters will need more detailed and mandatory 
treatment. Thus, the Steering Group recommends that 
requirements on disclosure of risk should be made a
matter for mandatory disclosure standards under the aegis 
of the proposed new Companies Commission. (See 
Completing the Structure, at para.3.35). This offers some 
scope for clear requirements as to the disclosure of high- 
risk practices. In the process it might be possible to hold 
parent company directors to account on how those risks 
are being dealt with as, for example, through the health 
and safety practices of overseas subsidiaries.
Why are these Ideas Not developed in the Final 
Report?
As noted in the introduction to this paper, the Final 
Report does not contain any further development of the 
above ideas. This can be explained by reference to two 
main factors: first the whole philosophy underlying the 
Review was unlikely to lead to a comprehensive 
reconsideration of group liability, and, secondly, the 
'elective' regime for groups is a weak idea that is unlikely 
to offer any significant overall benefit to the development 
of modern company law. Each of these two matters will 
now be considered in more detail.
The Philosophy of the Review and Group Liability
The Company Eaw Review was initiated in 1998 with 
the aim of creating 'a more effective, including cost
o ' o
effective, framework of law for companies to improve their 
competitiveness and so contribute to national growth and 
prosperity'. (See Modem Company Law Jor A Competitive 
Economy (Eondon, DTI, 1998) at para.3.1; hereafter Modern 
Company Law Jor A Competitive Economy). In addition, the new 
framework had to compare favourably with the company 
law frameworks of other developed economies and avoid 
any disincentives to inward investment into the UK by 
foreign firms caused by the obsolescence of parts of the 
existing law. (See Modern Company Law Jor A Competitive 
Economy at para.4.4). As part of this review, the question 
was raised whether the rights and duties of companies and 
their directors should extend to a wider range of 
'stakeholders' going beyond shareholders and 
encompassing employees, creditors and other participants. 
However, this issue would be bounded by a presumption 
against interventionist legislation, and in favour of 
facilitating markets, and by the overriding concern withto ' J o
law reform and not the wider ethical or managerial issueso
about the behaviour and standards of participants in 
companies, except to the extent that this could be reflected 
in company law. (See DTI Consultation Document Modem 
Company Law Jor a Competitive Economy-The Strategic Framework 
(1999, URN 99/654) at para.5.1.2). Therefore, the basic 
framework of analysis did not envisage a wholesale 
reconsideration of the ethical foundations of company law, 
nor of the nature and role of the company in society. 
Indeed, the Steering Group made clear in their March 
2000 Consultation Document that a wider 'pluralist' 
approach to governance issues, requiring directors to take 
into account wider stakeholder interests, would not be the
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basis for the reform proposals. At most they felt that the 
best way to achieve the objective of ensuring that 
companies contributed to the overall health and 
competitiveness of the economy was to have a shareholder 
oriented, inclusively framed, duty of loyalty, in the context 
of significant public policy oriented mandatory provisions 
on care and skill, conflict of interest and extended 
disclosure. (See DTI Consultation Document Modern 
Company Law Jor a Competitive Economy-Developing the 
Framework (London, DTI, 2000) document URN 00/656, 
Chapter 3 especially at para.3.22). The thinking of the 
Steering Group does not appear to have been strongly 
influenced by concerns such as those of involuntary 
creditors who have suffered personal injuries at the hands 
of the overseas subsidiaries of UK based MNEs. Rather, it 
was oriented towards the traditional, shareholder based, 
model of company law and towards a cost effective, pro- 
business, and approach to regulation.
This view is strongly re-stated in the Final Report, 
which stresses three 'core policies' over all others: a 'think 
small first' approach, which places the interests of small 
companies in a simple, less burdensome, system of 
company law at the fore, an inclusive, open and flexible 
regime of company governance and a flexible and 
responsive institutional structure for rule-making and 
enforcement. (See Final Report, above n 3 at para. 1.52). 
Against such a backdrop, there would have been little 
room for the re-regulation of group liability; a policy 
mainly aimed at large corporations and one, which 
increases the 'burden on business'.
Yet if one examines more closely the terms used by the 
Steering Group in their Final Report, there would, in fact, 
be little incompatibility between the Steering Group's 
aims and the development of a stronger regime for 
national and multinational group liability. In particular, the 
Final Report (while accepting that in many cases the result 
of the Steering Group's scrutiny has been de-regulation) 
asserts that where patterns of abuse exist, which disrupt 
and add cost to effective economic activity, rules have been 
recommended which restrict economic freedom to the 
extent necessary to prevent such abuse. (See Final Report, 
at para. 1.16). The Final Report continues:
'We also recognise that abuse may lead to a more indirect and 
intangible threat to our economic system   the loss of public 
confidence in the legitimacy oj the exercise oj the huge economic 
powers which are involved. It is right and in the longer term 
interests of the economy that the law should respond to these 
concerns...' (See Final Report, at para. 1.16).
Sadly, this sentiment does not extend to die issue of 
MNE group liability for die tortuous acts of overseas 
subsidiaries. Surely, in a world where the legitimacy of 
global capitalism is being increasingly questioned, such an 
approach is unacceptable. Clearly, if the avoidance of 
group liability for mass torts does not lead to a loss of 
'public confidence in the legitimacy of the exercise of huge
economic powers...' what does?
Furthermore, the Final Report asserts that the effective 
management and control ojresources requires taking into 
account a wide range ofjactors including, 'the need to manage 
relationships with employees, with suppliers of all kinds of 
resources.... and with customers, both direct and indirect.' (See 
"Final Report", at para. 1.23).
The Final Report continues:
'They include the need to manage wider impacts on consumers, 
the community and the environment. Reputational assets are also 
of critical importance in a world where external perceptions can 
transform business prospectsJbr better or worse.' (See "Final 
Report", at para. 1.23).
The Final Report concludes on this point by noting that 
many of these resources and assets are not reflected fully 
in the rules relating to corporate accountability. (See Final 
Report, at para. 1.24). This would suggest, again, that the 
governance questions raised by the transnational 
operations of MNEs need to be reconsidered. Not least of 
these is group liability, which, perhaps more than most 
areas of group action, will affect the firm's reputational 
assets.
The Weakness of the 'Elective Regime'for Groups
Apart form the specific criticisms offered above as to 
the unsuitability of the 'elective regime' to deal with risk 
reduction, other criticisms of a more general kind have
' o
been voiced against this proposal. In particular, responses 
received by the Steering Group highlighted two further 
matters of concern: firstly, that the proposal would lead to 
an overall reduction in the transparency of group activities 
which would be damaging to shareholder accountability 
and, secondly, that the proposal was probably dead in the 
water unless the Inland Revenue ceased to require each 
company in the group to submit individual accounts for 
tax purposes. Otherwise, any apparent cost saving arising 
from the reduction of reporting requirements under the 
elective regime would be neutralised by the need to 
continue to draw up accounts for revenue purposes. In the 
light of such wide criticisms it is safe to assume   though
o o
the Final Report does not say anything on the matter, not 
even in a footnote   that the idea has been quietly 
dropped. No other inference can be made on the basis of 
the publicly available information from the Steering 
Group.
Concluding Remarks
From the above it can be said diat English law still has 
a long way to go before a comprehensive doctrine of 
parent company liability for the acts of overseas 
subsidiaries or affiliates is in place. So far, die outcome of 
litigation has clarified some of the issues relating to
o o
jurisdiction. It is now possible for an English based parent 
company to be sued before the English forum for the acts
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of its subsidiaries or affiliates, even where a more 
appropriate foreign forum in the host country of the 
subsidiary/affiliate may be said to exist, if it can be shown 
that the foreign forum in question is unable to provide an 
environment for the litigation such that substantive justice 
can be done. However, English law has not yet gone so far 
as to accept a mandatory rule of jurisdiction over English 
domiciled parent companies for torts or other unlawful 
acts committed abroad by their affiliates.
As regards substantive liability, it remains to be seen 
whether - assuming the case does not settle first - the 
court in Cape will be moved by the kinds of policy based 
arguments put forward in this essay for an extension of the 
duty of care to parent companies for the acts of their 
affiliates. These policies can be summarised as follows: 
Firstly, limited liability was never intended to be used as a 
means of insulating succeeding layers of corporate group 
organisation from liability. Only the ultimate shareholders 
were to enjoy this protection. Acceptance of diis wide 
interpretation of limited liability allows for an illegitimate 
shifting of risk to the involuntary creditors of the company 
among whom the most conspicuous category are victims 
of personal injury caused by the negligent acts of affiliates. 
Secondly, in mass tort cases, the assets of the entire group 
may be needed to ensure a sufficient capital fund from 
which to satisfy claims. This is especially justifiable where 
it can be shown diat the group acts as an integrated 
economic entity, which together creates the wealth of the 
group enterprise. Thirdly, there is a growing expectation 
of public policy that corporations, including MNEs, 
should act in a socially responsible way. This may require 
inter alia acceptance of group liability for cases of gross 
corporate negligence leading to mass tort claims. In 
response to such an extension of the duty of care, the 
parent company may be able to rebut the allegation of 
liability by showing that, in the conduct of its management 
of the overseas affiliates involved, it acted reasonably in all 
the circumstances or that the chain of causation leading to 
the alleged harm was broken in a way that indicated the 
non-involvement of the parent. An alternative solution 
might be to impose strict liability on the parent for the 
acts of its subsidiaries, though such an outcome is unlikely 
in the Cape litigation and legislation to this effect is not
1 O O
forthcoming.
As regards the contribution of the Company Law 
Review Steering Group to the question at hand, this paper 
must end with a strong expression of dissatisfaction. The 
Steering Group has inexplicably avoided a proper analysis 
of the wider issue of parent company liability in tort for 
the acts of its affiliates (relying too much on a recendy 
strict judicial approach to the 'lifting of the corporate veil' 
which may not, in fact, be justifiable in such cases, at least 
in relation to liability for personal injuries. It has put 
forward a weak proposal for an 'elective' regime of group 
liability and the extent of the accountability obligations toJ Jo
be placed on directors when drawing up the OFR remains
obscure. Furthermore, it might be added that a legal
'to O
reform process of this importance must be sufficiently 
transparent for any interested person to be able to 
determine the precise course of the analysis without 
having to resort to any sources other than those made
O J
publicly available. This is not a case in which 'insider 
information' should be needed to complete the picture. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be said with confidence that the 
public record offers a clear picture of what, precisely, the 
Steering Group thinks now about the 'elective regime' or 
of its other views on corporate groups. It is simply 
unacceptable for such a high-level review process to end 
with the omission, from its Final Report, of a major 
question addressed in earlier consultation papers. To 
plead, as die Final Report does, that certain matters had to 
be left out to avoid an unmanageably large document (See 
Final Report, at para. 1.7) appears to be disingenuous. In 
all a missed opportunity, though, perhaps, a not 
unexpected outcome given the aims of the Company Eaw 
Review process.
This leaves a final question   in which direction could 
the law develop? As it stands the Review process has 
defended the status quo. However, it may be necessary, at 
some future date, to return to the issues raised in this 
chapter as part of a wider ranging review of basic 
principles of corporate social responsibility. In this 
connection, a possible starting point may be to refer to the 
OECD Guidelines Jor Multinational Enterprises, as the 
background for a new UK Code of Conduct for corporate 
groups to be undertaken by the proposed Companies 
Commission, should this beast ever be born. Such a Code 
could form the basis of guidance for directors as to the 
content of OFRs and of the general statement of director'sO
duties. This is not to say that the OECD Guidelines are, in 
themselves, a comprehensive or sufficient statement of 
principles. However, they do offer a minimum of agreed 
international standards of corporate social responsibility 
from which a developed body of national principles can 
emerge. This is significant, in that following the agenda setto o ' o to
by the OECD Guidelines takes care of the argument that 
greater regulation acts as a competitive disadvantage for 
the regulating system, given that the Guidelines represent 
an international consensus among the major capital 
exporting countries as to the proper conduct of MNEs, 
domiciled therein, in their global operations.
Such an international orientation should also reduce 
the power of any objection based on the notion that 
developing countries may become disadvantaged by the 
raising of corporate responsibility standards, enforced 
through litigation in the home country against the parent, 
in that they will become less attractive as locations for 
foreign investors given the rise in labour costs, and 
regulatory costs, that may follow. This argument cannot 
stand, as the observance of international minimum 
standards in developing country locations would still leave 
much room for competition over labour costs among
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countries and firms. The point is that, in observing such 
standards, MNEs would ensure that their activities do not 
amount to violations of fundamental labour and human 
rights standards that are condemned by the OECD 
Guidelines and, indeed, by other international standard 
setting instruments. Furthermore, the risk of litigation 
would be much reduced, as observance of international 
minimum standards by MNEs would provide evidence of 
practice that is in conformity with general legal standards, 
even where the host country fails to regulate by way of 
national legislation and/or adequate monitoring and 
enforcement.
This approach should also weaken arguments to the 
effect that litigation in the home country amounts to an 
illegitimate extraterritorial extension of home country 
standards to host countries. The issue would not revolve 
around the existence of lower labour and regulatory 
standards in the host country, and whether these can be 
ignored in favour of higher home country standards, but 
on whether international standards have been violated. It 
may well be that a dual system of standards could 
eventually emerge   higher level standards contained in 
the domestic law of the home (or, indeed, host) country 
which would normally apply, and lower level international 
minimum standards that can be applied in cases where the 
home/host country fails to apply such standards in its own 
law. It may be the only way to accommodate the needs of 
justice for foreign claimants who allege they have suffered 
harm at the hands of the local affiliate of a foreign MNE, 
and the freedom for countries, whose major comparative 
advantage lies on lower labour and regulatory compliance 
costs, to develop their economic policy in a way that 
exploits such an advantage. On the other hand, the 
significance of such an advantage should not be overstated. 
Competition over labour and regulatory costs is not a 
viable long-term strategy in the modern global economy, 
where capital-intensive production continues to displace 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour. The real objective must 
be to add value to the productive process and this requires 
development in skills and technology. (See further 
UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment and Development 
UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment 
agreements (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 
1998)). Thus, too much heed should not be given to 
claims that the adequate provision of health, labour and 
human rights standards undermines the competitive 
advantages of developing countries. It is an argument in 
support of failure and should be treated with the suspicion 
it deserves, especially when it comes from countries where
the real problem is not underdevelopment but 
authoritarian and elitist government, which does not place 
high value on equity and fairness towards its population. 
On way around such problems is to place a higher 
responsibility on MNEs to use their cross-border 
management network as a conduit for higher standards.
o o
Indeed, such firms generally apply higher than local 
standards in their treatment of workers in developing 
countries. Cases of lower local standards being applied are 
rare, but, as cases like Bhopal show, the results can be 
catastrophic. The real problem lies mainly in the 
treatment of local populations by local institutions, 
whether private businesses or public bodies, and in the 
effectiveness of local regulation. Imposing new 
responsibilities of MNEs cannot substitute for good 
governance by local institutions, but it can be of use in 
extreme cases where MNEs themselves allow their local 
operations to fall below acceptable minimum standards.
Finally, in relation to the question of standards of 
liability, should the parent company, in the conduct of its 
management of a subsidiary in a foreign country, have 
acted in a manner that violates its home country 
standards, then is it not unreasonable to hold it to those 
higher standards, even if they go far beyond what might be 
acceptable in the foreign host country, at least so far as 
liability is concerned? Differences in earning capacity and 
cost of living between the developed home country and 
the developing host country can then be taken into 
account at the compensation stage.
Also of importance in this connection is a review of the 
functions and uses of limited liability, and the attendant 
doctrine of corporate separation, which must be 
reconsidered in the light of the realities of corporate group 
power and risk allocation. After all, the aim of the 
Company Law Review has been to reconsider a company 
law that it has described in places as being Victorian, stuffy 
and obsolete. What could be more obsolete in a world 
economy dominated by extensive networks of 
interconnected group enterprises   based on both equity 
and contractual links   than a rigid, formalistic, doctrine of 
limited liability, based on an over-rigid and outdated notion 
of corporate separation, that is out of touch with the ability 
of MNEs to absorb risk and to take responsibility for any 
risk to third parties that they have created? ®
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